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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Carol Heller ("Heller"), who 
sought to recover from defendant Shaw Industries ("Shaw"), 
for certain respiratory illnesses allegedly caused by volatile 
organic compounds emitted by Shaw carpet installed in 
Heller's former home. The District Court's grant of summary 
judgment against Heller and in favor of Shaw is largely a 
function of its exclusion, following an extensive in limine 
hearing, of key expert testimony by which Heller hoped to 
establish liability. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. 
Civ.A.95-7657, 1997 WL 535163 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1997). In 
reviewing the District Court's rulings, we revisit the caselaw 
interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, particularly 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), and In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 
717 (3d Cir. 1994), and apply their teachings to this case. 
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After careful but deferential review, see General Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997), we conclude that, 
although the District Court erred in excluding certain aspects 
of the experts' proffered testimony, it properly excluded the 
central portions of their testimony, depriving Heller's claim of 
its needed evidentiary support.  
 
More specifically, the District Court was too restrictive in 
requiring Heller's medical expert to rely on published studies 
specifically linking Heller's illness with Shaw's product, and 
in requiring Heller's medical expert to rule out all alternative 
possible causes of her illness. However, it properly excluded 
this expert's causation testimony because his conclusion 
regarding the cause of Heller's illness was heavily based on 
a flawed temporal relationship between the installation of the 
Shaw carpet and the presence of Heller's illness. The District 
Court also properly excluded the testimony of Heller's 
environmental expert on the grounds that his environmental 
testing revealed levels of dangerous compounds in the air in 
Heller's home that were not significantly higher than 
background levels, and his methodology for extrapolating 
from these tests to estimate the (higher) levels of compounds 
at an earlier time was seriously flawed. Therefore, because 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
the key elements of Heller's experts' testimony necessary to 
prove causation, the grant of summary judgment will be 
affirmed.  
 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 
On September 30, 1993, Heller, her husband Thomas, and 
their two children moved into a nine-year old house in West 
Chester, Pennsylvania. Shortly after the move, Thomas Heller 
experienced allergy symptoms. In November and December 
1993, an allergist advised Mr. Heller to replace the carpeting 
in the home because cat hair from previous owners might 
have caused his allergic reactions. On December 13 and 14, 
1993, the Hellers put new carpeting--manufactured by Shaw 
Industries--in certain rooms of their home, including the  
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master bedroom on the first floor and a guest room on the 
second floor.   
 
In late December 1993, Carol Heller began to experience 
respiratory problems, including asthma, breathing difficulty, 
wheezing, coughing, and dizziness. After seeking treatment 
from her father, a physician, Heller consulted Dr. Joseph 
Papano, an allergist and one of her two expert witnesses.1 Her 
first visit to Dr. Papano was on February 15, 1994. Dr. 
Papano took Heller's medical and family history, questioned 
her about her environment (whether there were cats or dogs 
in the home, etc.), and performed allergy tests, chest X-rays, 
and pulmonary function tests. Based on the history, tests, 
and a physical examination, Dr. Papano ruled out various 
possible causes of her respiratory problems. In February 
1994, the doctor recommended that Heller contact Alan Todd 
of Todd Environmental Consultants (collectively "Todd") to 
test both the air quality in her home and the carpet.2 When 
Dr. Papano next saw Heller, on March 19, 1994, she was still 
experiencing problems, but informed him that her symptoms 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because, as discussed below, Dr. Papano relied heavily for 
his diagnosis on the temporal relationship between the 
installation of the Shaw carpet and the onset of Heller's 
illness, the date on which she began to experience her symptoms 
is a contested and important issue. Dr. Papano originally 
testified at his deposition that her symptoms began in "January 
1994," and he so stated in his expert witness report. However, at 
the Daubert hearing, he testified that the symptoms began in 
"mid-January 1994." Heller testified at the Daubert hearing that 
her symptoms began in late December 1993 or early January 1994, 
while her father testified that they began either in mid-December 
or during the first two weeks of December. Given the conflicting 
testimony, we find no clear error in the District Court's 
reliance, in its findings following the Daubert hearing, on 
Heller's testimony that her symptoms began in late December 1993. 
See Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *17 n.29. 
 
2. Dr. Papano's expert report represents that he referred Heller 
to Todd at her March 1994 visit, while Todd's expert report 
states that he was first contacted by Heller and did the initial 
testing in February. The District Court apparently credited Todd 
and we will not revisit this (supported) conclusion. Given that 
the initial home testing was performed by Todd in February 1994, 
Dr. Papano must have referred the Hellers to Todd in February. 
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improved when she was out of her house. At this time, she 
brought the doctor a sample of the Shaw carpet, which he 
testified had a strong odor. 
 
The Hellers contracted with Todd to perform the testing of 
the environment in the house and of the carpet. Todd initially 
tested for excessive levels of dust or other possible 
contaminants, finding nothing unusual. By April 7, 1994, the 
Heller family had moved out of their home in an attempt to 
eliminate Heller's respiratory problems. On April 14, 1994, 
Todd tested the air in the closet of one of the Hellers' 
bedrooms; the closet contained both some of the Shaw carpet 
and some carpet from an unknown manufacturer. Todd's 
initial test, conducted over approximately eight hours, found 
fourteen types of volatile organic compounds ("VOC"s) present 
in the air in the closet.   
 
Three weeks later, on May 5, 1994, the Shaw carpet was 
removed from the house. Less than a week later, on May 11, 
1994, Todd again tested the air in the bedroom closet for 
eight hours. During the period between the two tests, no 
other changes were made in the house: no objects were added 
or removed, the windows remained closed, and no persons 
entered or left the by-now empty house. In the second test, 
Todd found only five types of VOCs present. Four of these 
were present in levels virtually indistinguishable from the 
initial readings. Therefore, nine compounds completely 
disappeared and one (benzene) remained present, but at 
lower levels. Todd's initial conclusion, in a May 23, 1994, 
letter to Heller, was that "none of the compounds identified 
would be expected to typically result in asthmatic or 
sensitization responses." (Later, however, in his first expert 
witness report, dated January 16, 1997, he opined that the 
compounds that disappeared or diminished were emitted 
from the Shaw carpet, and were "the likely source of [the 
Hellers'] irritation and related responses.") 
 
The Hellers returned to the home briefly on May 11, 1994. 
Although the carpet had been removed six days earlier and 
the May 11 testing would reveal the presence of very few 
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VOCs, Mrs. Heller again experienced "wheezing, shortness of 
breath and an irritated throat." The Hellers then left the 
house, never to return. In November 1994, they sold the 
home for less than they had paid for it a year earlier.   
 
Dr. Papano's expert report stated that he performed a 
differential diagnosis, which involved ruling out possible 
causes of Heller's symptoms other than Shaw's carpet 
(including "an infectious cause"), and, based largely on the 
temporal relationship between her symptoms and the 
installation of the Shaw carpet, concluded that the Shaw 
carpet precipitated Heller's respiratory problems. As noted 
above, Alan Todd also offered his expert opinion (in his 
original expert report) that "to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty, . . . the illness[es] suffered by the Heller 
family were caused by their prolonged exposure to the VOC's 
measured in their home and emitted by the carpeting 
manufactured by Shaw Industries."   
 
In December 1995, the Hellers brought a diversity action 
against Shaw in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, under 28 U.S.C. S 1332, alleging breach of 
warranty, failure to warn, negligent and intentional 
misrepresentation, defective design, and violation of state 
consumer protection laws. The complaint sought 
compensatory and punitive damages for both personal 
injuries and property damage, as well as a medical 
monitoring award. To establish defective design and failure to 
warn, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's product 
caused her injuries. Causation therefore was the primary 
focus of the District Court's inquiry and the primary disputed 
issue in this case.   
 
Following extensive discovery, Shaw moved for summary 
judgment and, as an adjunct to that motion, moved in limine 
to exclude all of Heller's expert witness testimony. The 
District Court held a Daubert hearing over several days. It 
then filed an unpublished opinion and order, granting 
defendant's motions for exclusion of plaintiff's expert 
testimony and for summary judgment. See Heller v. Shaw 
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Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.95-7657, 1997 WL 535163 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 18, 1997).   
 
On appeal, we review a District Court's decision to exclude 
expert testimony for abuse of discretion. See Joiner, 118 S. 
Ct. at 517. The District Court's interpretation of the 
requirements of Rule 702, however, is subject to plenary 
review. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 749. As to the District Court's 
entry of summary judgment for defendants, "we exercise 
plenary review, construing all evidence and resolving all 
doubts raised by affidavits, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file in favor of the non- 
moving party." Iberia Foods Corp. v.  Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 
302 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 
Heller does not appear to dispute that, if we determine that 
the District Court properly excluded all of plaintiff's expert 
testimony, summary judgment for defendant was the proper 
course for the key claims of design defect and failure to warn. 
This is because, without either Dr. Papano's or Alan Todd's 
testimony, Heller would be left without any proof of 
causation, a necessary element for each of these claims. 
However, if we decide (as we do) that some of the testimony 
should have been admitted, we must determine whether that 
testimony is sufficient to create a material issue of fact on the 
causation issue. Most of our opinion will focus on the key 
underlying issue of the admissibility of Heller's expert witness 
testimony, on which the causation issue hinges. While there 
are other issues in the case, including breach of warranty 
and misrepresentations, we will address these only briefly, for 
they are easily disposed of without extended discussion.  
 
II.  Expert Witnesses: The Legal Background 
 
Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." Relying on the language of 
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Rule 702 and the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Supreme Court held in Daubert that expert 
testimony need be based only on a reliable and scientifically 
valid methodology that fits with the facts of a case. See 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.3 The Court listed four factors to 
guide a district court in its preliminary assessment of these 
requirements, but cautioned that these were guideposts and 
not required factors in each case. The factors are: (1) whether 
the methodology can and has been tested; (2) whether the 
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the methodology; 
and (4) whether the technique has been generally accepted in 
the proper scientific community. See id. at 593-94. The Court 
made clear that its listing of these factors should not obscure 
the fact that the district court's gatekeeper role is a flexible 
one, see id. at 594 & n.12, and that the factors are simply 
useful signposts, not dispositive hurdles that a party must 
overcome in order to have expert testimony admitted. In this 
regard, a party seeking to exclude (or to admit) expert 
testimony must do more than enumerate the factors from 
Daubert (and the additional ones from Paoli, discussed below) 
and tally the number that are or are not met by a particular 
expert's testimony.   
 
In Daubert, the Court noted that "[v]igorous cross- 
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence," and that, even if expert testimony is admitted, 
summary judgment might be warranted if a party has still 
failed to present sufficient evidence to get to the jury. Id. at 
596; see also Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750 n.21. Clearly, the Court 
envisioned cases in which expert testimony meets the  
Daubert standard yet is "shaky," and cases in which 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Daubert, the Supreme Court interred the decades-old Frye 
doctrine,from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923), which required that an expert's methodology be "generally 
accepted" within the scientific community before the expert's 
testimony could be admitted. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. 
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admissible expert testimony provides only a "scintilla" of 
support for a claim or defense. Put differently, an expert 
opinion must be based on reliable methodology and must 
reliably flow from that methodology and the facts at issue-- 
but it need not be so persuasive as to meet a party's burden 
of proof or even necessarily its burden of production. 
 
In Paoli, filed barely a year after Daubert, we identified a 
number of factors that a istrict court might use in 
evaluating expert testimony in addition to the four factors 
listed in Daubert. The additional factors include: (1) "the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation"; (2) "the relationship of the technique 
to methods which have been established to be reliable"; (3) 
the expert witness's qualifications; and (4) "the non-judicial 
uses to which the method has been put." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 
742 n.8. In Paoli, we explained that even if the judge believes 
"there are better grounds for some alternative conclusion," 
and that there are some flaws in the scientist's methods, if 
there are "good grounds" for the expert's conclusion, it should 
be admitted. Id. at 744.4   
 
We also emphasized in Paoli that the district court could 
not exclude the testimony simply because the conclusion was 
"novel" if the methodology and the application of the 
methodology were reliable. See id. at 746 n.15. However, we 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument in Paoli (also urged strongly 
by the plaintiff here) that the district court had abused its 
discretion by examining the experts' conclusions. While "[t]he 
focus, of course, must be solely on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate," 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, a district court must examine the 
expert's conclusions in order to determine whether they could  
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
4. In addition to the "good grounds" requirement, in a diversity 
case such as this, state rules on the degree of certainty 
required of an expert's opinion apply. In Pennsylvania, a doctor 
can give an opinion on the cause of a plaintiff's illness if he 
or she can do so with a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750-52. 
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reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the 
methodology used.5 
 
III.  Plaintiff's Expert Witnesses 
 
In this case, Heller must demonstrate, as part of her prima 
facie case, that Shaw's carpet emitted VOCs into the air; that 
she inhaled these VOCs; that she has an injury; and that the 
VOCs were the cause of this injury. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 860 (3d Cir. 1990). The expert 
testimony of Alan Todd, who is a certified industrial 
hygienist, is integral to plaintiff proving the first of these 
elements, and would bolster a medical conclusion on 
causation by demonstrating that the level of VOCs present in 
the Heller home was significantly higher than the background 
levels typically present. Without his testimony, drawn from 
the tests he performed in the Heller household, Heller has 
adduced no evidence that the Shaw carpet installed in the 
Heller home emitted VOCs into the air (let alone emitted them 
at a level sufficient to cause her illness). Further, even if 
Todd's testimony is admitted and is sufficient to meet 
plaintiff's burden on this first element at the summary 
judgment stage, Dr. Papano's testimony is necessary to prove 
that Heller became sick. His testimony also is critical for 
proving that the Shaw carpet was the cause of Heller's 
illness. While Todd also offered his expert testimony 
regarding the fourth element, i.e., that the VOCs from the 
Shaw carpet caused Heller's illness, as we will discuss below, 
only Dr. Papano is qualified to testify as to this element.6 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has 
proposed changes to Rule 702 that would reflect the standards 
from Daubert (and Paoli), requiring that an expert's testimony be 
based on reliable facts, be the product of reliable principles 
and methodology, and be based on a reliable application of these 
principles and methods to the facts of the case. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 702 (Preliminary Draft 1998). 
6. We do not focus on the second element, that Heller inhaled 
the VOCs. If she is able to prove, through her expert witnesses' 
testimony, that the Shaw carpet installed in the home emitted 
VOCs, that she became ill, and  
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A.  Dr. Papano 
 
Shaw did not challenge Dr. Papano's qualifications, so we 
mention them only briefly here. Dr. Papano is board-certified 
in internal medicine and allergy-immunology. He has been a 
practicing physician for more than 35 years, and currently 
treats 60 to 80 patients per week. Dr. Papano has held a 
number of prominent positions at Bryn Mawr Hospital in 
suburban Philadelphia, and has taught fellows and residents 
in allergy and internal medicine.  
 
Dr. Papano's written expert report, from January 1997, 
opines that he "can state with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, that both Mr. and Mrs. Heller's respiratory 
problems or difficulties [were] precipitated [by] the rugs 
installed in their home in December 1993." Dr. Papano also 
testified at the Daubert hearing that, following Mrs. Heller's 
visit in May 1994, "I concluded that the carpeting in her 
house was the major factor in her illness." The basis for Dr. 
Papano's conclusion was a differential diagnosis drawn from 
his examination of Heller, the results of a series of medical 
tests, review of Heller's personal and family medical history, 
and Heller's descriptions of her personal activities (smoking, 
etc.) and environmental conditions ("cats, dogs, the type of 
heating system, rugs, pillows, things of that sort").  
 
Dr. Papano testified that he also relied on the temporal 
relationship between Heller's exposure to the Shaw carpet 
and the onset of her symptoms, as well as information from 
Todd Environmental Consultants after its testing of the Heller 
home in April and May 1994. Finally, Dr. Papano relied on 
his more than thirty years of experience treating patients 
with allergy-related medical problems and his knowledge of 
environmental causes of respiratory problems gained at 
professional seminars he attended. 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
that the VOCs caused her illness, it certainly would be within a 
jury's purview to find that Heller had inhaled the VOCs, without 
further direct proof. 
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The District Court excluded all of Dr. Papano's testimony, 
largely because he could point to no studies indicating at 
what level the VOCs detected in the Heller home could cause 
symptoms such as those experienced by Mrs. Heller, see 
Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *15; his differential diagnosis 
"failed to rule out all alternative possible causes of Carol 
Heller's illness," id. at *16; and the court found that the 
temporal relationship on which Dr. Papano relied was weak,  
see id. at *17. We address each of these in turn.  
 
1.  Lack of Studies 
 
The District Court faulted Dr. Papano for citing "no 
research to support his contention that the levels of VOCs 
detected by Todd Environmental can and did cause the type 
of illness allegedly experienced by [Mrs. Heller]." Id. at *15. 
The court found that the lack of studies supporting Dr. 
Papano's conclusion was a "defect" in his testimony. Id. We 
do not believe that the court's reading of Rule 702--as 
requiring research studies supporting a finding of general 
causation--is  correct. Assuming  that  Dr.  Papano  conducted 
a thorough differential diagnosis (see infra Part III.A.2) and 
had thereby ruled out other possible causes of Heller's 
illness, and assuming that he had relied on a valid and 
strong temporal relationship between the installation of the 
carpet and Heller's problems (see infra Part III.A.3), we do not 
believe that this would be an insufficiently valid methodology 
for his reliably concluding that the carpet caused Heller's 
problems.   
 
A number of courts, including our own, have looked 
favorably on medical testimony that relies heavily on a 
temporal relationship between an illness and a causal event.  
See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 
809 (3d Cir. 1997). The temporal relationship will often be 
(only) one factor, and how much weight it provides for the 
overall determination of whether an expert has "good 
grounds" for his or her conclusion will differ depending on 
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the strength of that relationship. For example, if there was a 
minor oil spill on the Hudson River on the same day that 
Heller began experiencing her symptoms in West Chester, 
Pennsylvania, and she recovered around the time the oil was 
cleaned up, a proper differential diagnosis and temporal 
analysis by a well-qualified physician such as Dr. Papano 
could not possibly lead to the conclusion that the oil spill 
caused Heller's illness. See, e.g., Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745 (both 
the methodology and the application of that methodology 
must be reliable). Conversely, "if a person were doused with 
chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, 
the need for published literature showing a correlation 
between the two may be lessened." Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 
F. Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 
F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 684 
(1998). 
 
The present case falls between these two hypotheticals. In 
this middle area, we do not believe that Daubert and Paoli 
require a physician to rely on definitive published studies 
before concluding that exposure to a particular object or 
chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiff's illness. 
Both a differential diagnosis and a temporal analysis, 
properly performed, would generally meet the requirements  
of Daubert and Paoli. While again emphasizing that the  
Daubert/Paoli factors are simply guideposts, we note that 
differential diagnosis "consists of a testable hypothesis," has 
been peer reviewed, contains standards for controlling its 
operation, is generally accepted, and is used outside of the 
judicial context. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8. 
 
The question we have thus posed is whether the expert's 
conclusion can be considered reliable if it is based on these 
scientifically valid methods, but is not based on published 
studies. We acknowledge that a number of courts have 
answered this question in the negative. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (holding that, absent a "compelling" situation such as 
the Cavallo example above, a temporal relationship is to be 
given little weight when there are few scientific studies 
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supporting a medical expert's specific causation diagnosis),  
petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1998) 
(No. 98-992); Cavallo, 892 F. Supp. at 766-69 (excluding 
expert testimony on causation primarily because "there is no 
support for this causation theory in the scientific literature"). 
But see Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (finding district court abused its discretion by 
excluding expert testimony that was based on reliable 
methodology simply because "no epidemiological or animal 
studies" linked defendant's product to plaintiff's disease). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that it was not an abuse of a 
district court's discretion to exclude expert testimony when 
there was "too great an analytical gap between the data [of 
scientific studies] and the opinion proffered," Joiner, 118 S. 
Ct. at 519, but we do not read the Supreme Court as 
requiring a medical expert to always rely on published 
studies indicating the exposure necessary to cause a 
particular illness. Rather, given the tenuous link in Joiner 
between plaintiff's exposure to PCBs and the onset of his 
cancer a number of years later, the lack of studies linking 
PCBs to cancer in humans left only "the ipse dixit of the 
expert" to support his conclusion. Id. Therefore, the Court 
held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district 
court to exclude the expert's testimony. See id. 
 
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the flexible nature of the Daubert inquiry, and the proper 
roles of the judge and the jury in evaluating the ultimate 
credibility of an expert's opinion, we do not believe that a 
medical expert must always cite published studies on general 
causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular 
object caused a particular illness. Cf. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller 
Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming admission 
of treating doctor's testimony despite the fact that he "could 
not point to a single piece of medical literature that says glue 
fumes cause throat polyps"). To so hold would doom from the 
outset all cases in which the state of research on the specific 
ailment or on the alleged causal agent was in its early stages, 
and would effectively resurrect a Frye-like bright-line 
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standard, not by requiring that a methodology be "generally 
accepted," but by excluding expert testimony not backed by 
published (and presumably peer-reviewed) studies. We have 
held that the reliability analysis applies to all aspects of an 
expert's testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the 
expert's opinion, the link between the facts and the 
conclusion, et alia. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743-45. However, 
not only must each stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, 
but each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly 
without bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.   
 
In the actual practice of medicine, physicians do not wait 
for conclusive, or even published and peer-reviewed, studies 
to make diagnoses to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. Such studies of course help them to make various 
diagnoses or to rule out prior diagnoses that the studies call 
into question. However, experience with hundreds of patients, 
discussions with peers, attendance at conferences and 
seminars, detailed review of a patient's family, personal, and 
medical histories, and thorough physical examinations are 
the tools of the trade, and should suffice for the making of a 
differential diagnosis even in those cases in which peer- 
reviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis of the 
physician. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize as much.  
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee's note ("[A] 
physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on 
information from numerous sources and of considerable 
variety . . . . The physician makes life-and-death decisions in 
reliance upon them. His validation, expertly performed and 
subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial 
purposes."). 
 
We repeat that all of these reliable methods for making a 
diagnosis cannot sanitize an otherwise untrustworthy 
conclusion. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745-46; see also Joiner, 118 
S. Ct. at 519 ("A court may conclude that there is simply too 
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered."). In this case, however, there is certainly evidence 
in the record--from Shaw's own records and from reliable 
studies--that carpets emit VOCs and that VOCs can cause 
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certain health problems. This might be sufficient to give Dr. 
Papano "good grounds" for making his conclusion, even 
though the District Court (or a jury) may not agree with that 
conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that the District Court 
excluded Dr. Papano's testimony on the basis that it was not 
grounded in scientific studies, it erred. However, it was not 
necessarily error to exclude Dr. Papano's causation 
conclusion as unreliable if he relied on no scientific studies 
and the remaining foundation for his conclusion was shaky. 
 
2.  Dr. Papano's Differential Diagnosis 
 
The District Court also found it important that Dr. Papano 
"failed to rule out all alternative possible causes of Carol 
Heller's illness." Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *16 (emphasis 
added). Applying plenary review, we hold that this is a more 
stringent standard for a medical expert's differential diagnosis 
than is required under Rule 702. A medical expert's 
causation conclusion should not be excluded because he or 
she has failed to rule out every possible alternative cause of  
a plaintiff's illness. As Professor Capra, Reporter to the 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, has 
put it:  
 
      [T]o require the experts to rule out categorically all other  
      possible causes for an injury would mean that few 
      experts would ever be able to testify . . . . 
 
       . . . Obvious alternative causes need to be ruled out.  
      All possible causes, however, cannot be and need not be 
      eliminated before an expert's testimony will be admitted.  
 
Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 728 
(1998). 
 
Differential diagnosis, as we noted in Paoli, is "the basic 
method of internal medicine." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 755. Dr. 
Papano engaged in this basic method in a reliable manner, 
ordering standard laboratory tests, physically examining the 
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plaintiff, taking medical histories, and considering alternative 
causes of the plaintiff's illness. See id. at 755, 758. That he 
used this technique to "testify to a novel conclusion" is not 
sufficient grounds for excluding his testimony. Id. at 759 
n.27. Dr. Papano was not required to rule out all alternative 
possible causes of Heller's illness. Rather, only "where a 
defendant points to a plausible alternative cause and the 
doctor offers no explanation for why he or she has concluded 
that was not the sole cause, that doctor's methodology is 
unreliable." Id. 
 
When cross-examining Dr. Papano at the Daubert hearing, 
Shaw offered a number of plausible alternative causes, 
including dust from other carpets, benzene and 2- 
butoxyethanol from other sources, and paint and new 
hardwood floors in the house. Dr. Papano did not offer 
detailed explanations for why he concluded that these were 
not the causes of plaintiff's illness, but his responses, 
grounded in the alleged temporal relationship, the results of 
Todd's testing showing a reduction in VOCs when the carpet 
was removed, and Heller's medical history and physical 
examination, certainly are more than "no explanation." See, 
e.g., App. at A602 (Dr. Papano's discussion of his 
consideration of other possible causes). Had the District 
Court applied the proper standard for evaluating a differential 
diagnosis, we might conclude that it had not abused its 
discretion in finding that Dr. Papano's responses were 
inadequate, but it did err in requiring him to "rule out all 
alternative possible causes." 
 
As we concluded in Paoli, a physician need not conduct 
every possible test to rule out all possible causes of a 
patient's illness, "so long as he or she employed sufficient 
diagnostic techniques to have good grounds for his or her 
conclusion." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 761. More recently, we held 
that a district court erred in excluding expert medical 
testimony because a defendant's suggested alternative causes 
(once adequately addressed by plaintiff's expert) affect the 
weight that the jury should give the expert's testimony and 
not the admissibility of that testimony. See Kannankeril, 128 
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F.3d at 808. In Kannankeril, we held that even absent hard 
evidence of the level of exposure to the chemical in question, 
a medical expert could offer an opinion that the chemical 
caused plaintiff's illness. See id. at 809. The medical expert 
there relied primarily on the temporal relationship and the 
nature of the plaintiff's complaints, as in the present case. 
While the potential harm of the chemical in that case was 
clearer than in this case, there was also some information 
indicating that there may not have been a harmful level of the 
chemical in Kannankeril's home. Nonetheless, we emphasized 
that the district court should take care not to "mistake 
credibility questions for admissibility questions." Id. If the 
medical expert's "opinion on causation has a factual basis 
and supporting scientific theory" that is reliable, it should be 
admitted. Id. 
 
3.  Temporal Relationship 
 
Neither Heller nor Dr. Papano disputes the absence of 
definitive studies establishing the level at which the VOCs 
detected in the Heller home could cause respiratory illnesses 
such as those Heller experienced. Nor do they dispute that 
studies linking Shaw carpeting to such illnesses do not exist. 
Rather, they rely heavily on the temporal relationship 
between the installation of the carpeting and the onset of 
Heller's illness, as well as the fact that she appeared to 
improve in health when she was away from her home. As we 
noted in Part III.A.1 supra, we do not believe that the lack of 
studies linking an alleged defective product to a plaintiff's 
illness is fatal to a plaintiff's case on causation. However, as 
noted, some reliable basis for a causation conclusion must 
exist--and here, that basis was largely the alleged temporal 
relationship between the installation (and removal) of the 
Shaw carpet and the presence of Heller's illness. 
 
The District Court relied on three major weaknesses in the 
temporal relationship to find Heller's burden to prove 
causation unmet. We review the factual findings of the 
District Court for clear error and can find none, as the 
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background facts to its critique of Dr. Papano's temporal 
conclusion are undisputed: (1) the Shaw carpeting was 
installed in the Heller home in mid-December 1993; (2) Carol 
Heller first experienced respiratory problems no earlier than 
late December 1993; (3) Mr. and Mrs. Heller experienced 
renewed symptoms upon returning to the home in May 1994, 
almost a week after the carpet had been removed; and (4) 
although Dr. Papano originally relied on the same temporal 
relationship to conclude that the carpeting was the cause of 
Thomas Heller's illness, Mr. Heller actually experienced his 
symptoms prior to the installation of the Shaw carpet. 
 
In reaching its legal conclusion regarding the temporal 
relationship, the court first noted that Heller did not 
experience symptoms until at least two weeks after the Shaw 
carpeting was installed.7 Dr. Papano himself testified that a 
reaction to VOCs in the home would typically occur within 24 
hours of exposure to the VOCs. See App. at A638. While 
Heller contends that this can be explained by her use of an 
upstairs bedroom (rather than the downstairs master 
bedroom) after the Shaw carpet was first installed, she 
admitted that both of these rooms contained the Shaw carpet. 
 
Not only did Heller's symptoms not appear until at least 
one or two weeks after the Shaw carpeting was installed, but 
they remained after the carpet was removed in May 1994. 
The District Court properly faulted Dr. Papano's testimony for 
not accounting for this fact as well. Plaintiff attempts to 
explain this weakness in the temporal relationship by 
reference to the "sink" effect, by which VOCs sink into objects 
other than the ones from which they are emitted and then are 
re-emitted at later times. See Appellants' Br. at 21 n.6. This 
explanation is dubious, however, as the air was actually 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
7. Plaintiff relies on the testimony of her other expert, Alan 
Todd, to establish the level of VOCs at the time the carpet was 
installed in mid-December. While we find serious problems with 
his calculations, see infra Part III.B.2, we note that the level 
of VOCs in mid-December would appear immaterial, as Heller did 
not experience any adverse reactions until at least one or two 
weeks later, when, according to plaintiff's own experts, the 
level of VOCs would be substantially lower. 
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measured on the day Heller returned to the home and 
experienced renewed symptoms--and there were virtually no 
VOCs present at that time. Further, this "sink" effect theory 
was disavowed by Heller's own environmental expert. See 
App. at A882-883. Most importantly, it is not evident that Dr. 
Papano relied on any "sink" effect or any other explanation 
for why Heller continued to suffer ill effects from the Shaw 
carpeting after it had been removed from the house. Finally, 
the District Court noted that Dr. Papano's temporal analysis 
failed to explain why Thomas Heller (who Dr. Papano also 
concluded suffered ill effects from the Shaw carpet) exhibited 
allergy symptoms prior to the installation of the Shaw carpet. 
 
These weaknesses, according to the District Court, 
"disprove the existence of a temporal relationship." Heller, 
1997 WL 535163, at *17. While we review such a conclusion 
for abuse of discretion, as noted above, our review of the 
court's legal analysis--i.e., whether it properly followed Rule 
702 as prescribed in Daubert and Paoli--is plenary. The 
court's analysis of the temporal relationship included the 
criticism that "plaintiffs proffer no statistical evidence to show 
the existence of a statistically significant correlation" between 
the Hellers' symptoms and their exposure to the Shaw carpet.  
Id. However, a physician's diagnosis, based in part on a 
strong temporal relationship between symptoms and 
exposure, need not necessarily be supported by "a 
statistically significant correlation." What is required is that 
the physician have "good grounds" for his or her diagnosis.  
See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744 (noting that, even if the judge 
believes "there are better grounds for some alternative 
conclusion" and that there are some flaws in the expert's 
methods, if there are "good grounds" for the expert's 
conclusion, it should be admitted). Further, when the 
temporal relationship is strong and is part of a standard 
differential diagnosis, it would fulfill many of the  
Daubert/Paoli factors. See id. at 742 n.8. 
 
Here, however, we have no problem concluding that the 
temporal relationship between the exposure to the Shaw 
carpeting and the onset of Heller's illness was questionable 
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at best and exculpatory at worst. While the district court may 
not reject an expert's conclusion simply because the court 
finds it wanting, it is surely within the court's province to 
ensure that the conclusion, particularly a medical expert's 
ultimate conclusion on causation, "fits" with the data alleged 
to support it. See id. at 746 ("[T]he expert's view that a 
particular conclusion 'fits' a particular case must itself 
constitute scientific knowledge . . . ."). Had the Hellers 
experienced a prompt reaction at the time the Shaw carpeting 
was installed in mid-December 1993, and had they suffered 
no reaction upon return to their home after the Shaw carpet 
was removed in May 1994, this would be the type of temporal 
relationship that might reliably support a conclusion that the 
carpet was the cause of plaintiff's illness. However, that is not 
the case here.  
 
4.  Dr. Papano's Testimony: Summary and Conclusion 
 
We have explained that the District Court erred to the 
extent that it required Dr. Papano's testimony to be backed 
by scientific studies linking the type and level of VOCs 
detected in the Heller home to Heller's illness, and to the 
extent that it required Dr. Papano to rule out all other 
possible causes of Heller's illness before concluding that the 
Shaw carpet was the cause. The District Court could, 
however, properly consider the fact (rather than requiring it 
as a prerequisite to admissibility) that Dr. Papano relied on 
few, if any, studies linking exposure to the VOCs allegedly 
emitted by the Shaw carpet to the illnesses suffered by Heller. 
It could also properly consider Dr. Papano's (weak) responses 
to Shaw's proffered alternative theories on the cause of 
Heller's illness in evaluating whether he truly had "good 
grounds" to arrive at the causation conclusion he reached. 
 
Dr. Papano relied extremely heavily on the temporal 
relationship between the installation of the carpet and 
Heller's illness, and the District Court did not err in 
concluding that this relationship was unreliable. Without 
either scientific studies pointing to VOCs of the type and 
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amount detected as the culprit or a reliable temporal 
relationship, Dr. Papano was left with no valid means for 
concluding that the Shaw carpet was the cause of Heller's 
illness. Dr. Papano's conclusion had to "fit" with the data and 
the methodology that precedes it. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 746. 
Even if the data (e.g., the medical history, the laboratory 
studies, evidence of VOCs in the Heller home) and the 
methodology (i.e., the differential diagnosis) were reliable, the 
District Court did not err in finding that the conclusion Dr. 
Papano reached did not reliably flow from this data and 
methodology. Under these circumstances, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in ultimately deciding to exclude 
Dr. Papano's testimony regarding the cause of Heller's  
illness.8 
 
B.  Alan Todd 
 
Plaintiff's second expert witness, Alan Todd, of Todd 
Environmental Consultants, opined in his initial expert report 
that "the illness[es] suffered by the Heller family were caused 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
8. We add that the District Court should not necessarily have 
excluded all of Dr. Papano's testimony. In many cases, a treating 
physician whose methods and data are reliable, but whose 
causation conclusion is excluded as unreliable, may still have 
other reliable testimony to offer. In such a case, the medical 
expert should be permitted to "testify about his examination of 
[the plaintiff], the tests he conducted, and the diagnosis he 
reached," Moore, 151 F.3d at 273, as these are all based on 
reliable methods. See also Cavallo, 892 F. Supp. at 770 ("There 
is no question that Dr. Bellanti is qualified to testify 
regarding the nature of Ms. Cavallo's illnesses . . . . Rather, 
the focus of the dispute is whether his opinion regarding the 
cause of these illnesses is scientifically valid and therefore 
admissible under Daubert." (first emphasis added)). Thus, even if 
it was proper to exclude Dr. Papano's expert testimony regarding 
the cause of Heller's illness, as we conclude it was, testimony 
as to his examination and treatment of her illness was almost 
certainly relevant and reliable. It would be relevant to at least 
one of the elements in most of Heller's claims, i.e., whether or 
not she suffered an injury (as well as the extent of her 
injuries, a relevant factor in any damages analysis). Of course, 
without Dr. Papano's causation testimony, summary judgment may 
still have been warranted--and we conclude that it was--because 
without it there was insufficient evidence of causation to get to 
the jury. 
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by their prolonged exposure to the VOC's measured in their 
home and emitted by the carpeting manufactured by Shaw 
Industries." Todd based his conclusion on his testing of the 
air in a closet of the Heller home in which the Shaw carpet 
had been installed, and on his extrapolation from the results 
of these closet tests. He thereby estimated the level of VOCs 
emitted by the Shaw carpet at the time it was installed, 
approximately four months prior to his testing. We note 
preliminarily that we are doubtful that a non-medical expert 
such as Todd is qualified to testify as to the cause of 
someone's illness.9 We need not address that issue here, 
however, because we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding Todd's extrapolations as 
being unreliable so that any arguable basis for Todd's 
causation conclusion was missing, making it appropriate for 
the District Court to exclude Todd's causation testimony.   
 
Todd is a certified industrial hygienist, who consults on 
environmental problems in occupational and residential 
settings. His qualifications were not challenged by defendant, 
though as we discuss below, his methodologies were 
thoroughly attacked. Because Heller must show that her 
exposure to VOCs was at a greater level than "the normal 
'background' level," Paoli, 916 F.2d at 860-61, and that this 
exposure came from defendant's carpet, see id. at 860, Todd's 
testimony was necessary for her to survive summary 
judgment. Todd testified that, at the time the Shaw carpet 
was installed (December 13-14, 1993), the level of benzene in 
the air in the Heller home was approximately 1712 parts per 
billion ("ppb"), and that this benzene came from the Shaw 
carpet. He also estimated that, at that time, the level of other 
VOCs was approximately 11,469 ppb, and that these VOCs 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
9. While Todd was knowledgeable about studies on VOCs and 
illness, and on recommended maximum occupational VOC levels, he 
is not a physician and did not examine the Hellers nor discuss 
with them their symptoms or their medical histories. Thus, 
whatever his qualifications for testifying about the source and 
level of VOCs in the Hellers' house or his expertise regarding 
dangerous levels of VOCs, his qualification to offer an opinion 
on the ultimate cause of the Hellers' illnesses is another 
matter. 
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came from the Shaw carpet. If his methodologies were 
reliable, and his application of these methodologies to the 
facts of the case was reliable, his conclusion that there were 
VOCs, emitted from Shaw's carpet, at levels higher than 
background levels could support a proper medical diagnosis 
that the Shaw carpet caused the plaintiff's illness.  
 
1.  Subtraction Methodology10 
 
Todd's method for determining the source and level of 
VOCs in the Heller house was to take air samples in a 
bedroom closet before and after the Shaw carpet had been 
removed from the house (and the closet). Comparing the two 
measurements, he determined the amount of VOCs emitted 
by the Shaw carpet, the only item present for the first test 
and absent for the second one. If the methodology for 
collecting air samples and for measuring the VOCs present in 
the air was valid and reliable, and the difference in the level 
of VOCs was significant, this part of Todd's testimony would 
be probative of whether or not the Shaw carpeting emitted 
VOCs, and should have been admitted.   
 
While the District Court faulted Todd's subtraction 
methodology on a number of counts, we uphold its decision 
to exclude this testimony largely because the conclusions 
Todd reached could not reliably flow from the data and 
methodology he used. We first consider the District Court's 
criticisms of Todd's subtraction methodology (not all of which 
we find warranted) before turning to our own critique of his 
testimony.   
 
The District Court found that the studies cited by Todd for 
the proposition that carpet such as Shaw's could cause 
Heller's illness did not support this conclusion. See Heller, 
1997 WL 535163, at *9. We address this aspect of the matter 
 
 _______________________________________________________ 
 
10.  Although not so labeled by Todd, the parties and the 
District Court utilized the terms "subtraction methodology" and 
"back-extrapolation methodology" to describe Todd's two major 
methodologies. For the sake of consistency, we will do likewise. 
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in the margin, for, given our ultimate conclusion, we need not 
decide whether the District Court's analysis of the studies 
was an appropriate factor in determining whether Todd's 
subtraction methodology itself was valid and reliable.11 
 
In addition, although Todd testified that he used an 
accepted methodology for collecting the air samples and 
described this method in detail, Shaw and the District Court 
criticized him for not using some other test, specifically a 
closed chamber laboratory test. While the latter is an 
accepted test for measuring compounds in new carpet, it is 
neither the only nor necessarily the best test for measuring 
VOCs from carpet already installed in a home. Further, the 
record provides ample evidence that laboratory tests and on- 
site tests produce similar results, see, e.g., App. at A88, and  
defendant's own expert conducted on-site tests in a number 
of carpet-emission studies, see id. at SA0892, SA1013, 
SA1030. That expert also admitted using in a prior study 
essentially the same "subtraction method" used by Todd. See  
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
11.  In our view, the record can be read to support Todd's claim 
that carpeting such as Shaw's can emit some of the VOCs detected 
in the Heller home and may cause illnesses similar to those 
suffered by Heller after prolonged exposure. In any event, we do 
not believe that unequivocal studies are required before a 
qualified expert may opine that a product emits a certain 
compound or causes a certain irritation, if the basis for the 
opinion is otherwise reliable and scientifically valid.  
 
Further, this aspect of Todd's testimony was based on first-hand, 
field testing of the object in question--the Shaw carpet. If Todd 
was qualified to conduct such tests, and if his means of 
collecting air samples was scientifically valid and the initial 
conclusion he drew--that the Shaw carpet was the source of a 
certain level of VOCs--was reliably drawn from the field testing, 
this testimony would be both reliable and relevant. We note that 
this is not a case in which a party sought to avoid the 
application of Daubert by labeling such testing "non-scientific." 
See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435- 
36 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that testimony based on "skill- or 
experience-based observation," rather than on "application of 
scientific principles or theories," was not subject to Daubert), 
cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 
2339 (1998). Here, plaintiff argued that Todd's testimony met the 
requirements of Daubert in that it was reliable and valid. 
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id. at A1152-1157.12 Properly performed, such on-site tests 
would appear to meet most of the factors suggested in  
Daubert and Paoli. 
 
Finally, the District Court placed great weight on Todd's 
alleged failure to "insure that other variables did not [affect] 
the air sampling tests." Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *12. 
However, Todd testified that the contents of the closet (and 
the house) remained constant and that the environmental 
conditions in the house were essentially static (i.e., no 
persons came or went, the windows were not opened, the rate 
of air flow was not changed, etc.). While it is true that the 
concentration of VOCs is affected by more than the emission 
from a source such as carpeting, a substantial decline in the 
amount of VOCs would constitute strong (and reliable) 
evidence that at least some of these VOCs were coming from 
the Shaw carpet--the only item that was removed before the 
lower readings were taken.   
 
Our decision does not turn, however, on the validity of 
Todd's air sampling methodology, i.e., on whether the testing 
was unreliable because he did not conduct different tests or 
did not control for other possible sources of VOCs. This is 
because the District Court was correct to question the 
reliability of Todd's conclusions. The level of VOCs detected 
by Todd's closet tests, even if they could all be attributed to 
the Shaw carpet, were substantially lower than any amounts 
ever known or believed to cause illnesses in humans; in fact, 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
12.  The court also faulted Todd's testimony because he "did not 
conduct further tests to ascertain whether changes in the levels 
of VOCs were attributable to the removal of the carpet or whether 
the changes were attributable to the natural fluctuation in VOC 
levels within the home." Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *12. It is 
not clear what "further tests" the District Court would have 
required. Todd did not take snapshot tests at single moments, 
which would have been subject to natural fluctuations and random 
error; such tests likely would not be reliable enough to meet 
the Daubert standard. Rather, Todd took air sample readings over 
eight hours on one day, with the carpet present, and then took 
readings for eight hours on a second day, without the carpet 
present. Such prolonged readings may be sufficient to account for 
"natural fluctuations in VOC levels." 
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they appear to be extremely close to the background amounts 
(i.e., the levels naturally occurring in the air) for each of the 
VOCs.13 A number of studies cited by the parties and 
contained in the record have concluded that any ill effects 
from these particular VOCs (and related ones) only occur at 
much higher levels than those found in the Heller home. See, 
e.g., App. at SA0835-0840 (finding basic irritation at 50-750 
ppb of VOCs; headaches at 750-6250 ppb; and additional 
neurotoxic effects at levels above 6250 ppb); id. at A126 
(reporting pulmonary irritation at 275 ppb; slight sensory 
irritation at 600 ppb); id. at SA0210 (finding that persons 
exposed to 25,000 ppb of benzene for eight hours 
demonstrated no acute effect). Another major study found 
that the background levels of benzene averaged 5 ppb overall 
and about 3 ppb indoors, see id. at SA0200, actually above 
the levels (2.2 ppb) detected in the Heller home in April, when 
the Shaw carpet was still in the house.14 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
13. We note that a number of the VOCs allegedly attributable to 
the Shaw carpet were detected at levels well below the maximum 
amounts recommended by various federal agencies and professional 
groups. For example, only 2.22 ppb of benzene was detected in 
April 1994; the lowest suggested limit for exposure to benzene is 
500 ppb. Other VOCs detected in the closet, with the maximum 
amount attributable to the Shaw carpet and the lowest recommended 
limit, include: 
 
VOC                         Amount Found   Recommended 
                            (in ppb)       Limit (in ppb) 
  
2-Butoxyethanol              5.60           20,000 
Carbon Tetrachloride         0.13            2,000 
Cumene                       0.11           50,000 
Methyl Chloroform            0.09          200,000 
 
See Richard J. Lewis, Sr., Hazardous Chemicals Desk Reference 
113, 180, 235, 318, 745 (4th ed. 1997). We note that these limits 
are for long-term occupational exposure and assume exposure at 
these levels for 40 hours per week, indefinitely. 
 
14.  Unfortunately, comparing these studies and industry 
documents to Todd's findings can be difficult, as the latter are 
reported in terms of ppb (parts per billion), while many of the 
studies and industry documents measure air concentration in mg/m3 
(milligrams per cubic meter) or ug/m3 (micrograms per cubic 
meter). The conversion from one to the other is  
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Todd attempted to address this shortcoming in his 
testimony by dividing the suggested occupational limits by 
420, based on two assumptions whose validity is problematic. 
First, because the limits are based on a 40-hour work week 
and there are potentially 168 hours per week in which a 
person could occupy her home (if she never left), Todd 
reduced the limits by 4.2. Then, because the occupational 
limits are based on an average healthy adult, Todd testified 
that it is standard practice to reduce these limits further by 
a factor of 100, to account for the fact that homes include 
children, older adults, unhealthy persons, etc. As a result, he 
opined that the limit for exposure to benzene in the home is 
actually approximately 1.2 ppb (i.e., 500 ppb / 420), slightly 
lower than the amount attributable to the Shaw carpet.   
 
This methodology is suspect. In one study in the record, 
the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air 
Conditioning Engineers ("ASHRAE") is cited as recommending 
a maximum level of contaminants arrived at by dividing the 
OSHA limit by 10, see App. at SA0860-0861, for essentially 
the same reason that Todd gave for dividing the permissible 
limits by 420. The OSHA limit for benzene is 1000 ppb; the 
ASHRAE limit, then, would be 100 ppb, still well above the 
amount detected in the Heller home in April (2.22 ppb). The 
OSHA limit for 2-butoxyethanol is 25,000 ppb, making the 
ASHRAE limit 2500 ppb, significantly higher than the 
amount detected in the Hellers' house (5.60 ppb). At all 
events, even if the methodology is valid, the levels measured 
in April (the earliest period at which Todd actually took air 
concentration measurements) do not even approach the 
(modified) recommended maximums for any of the other 
VOCs.   
 
Thus, while the closet tests conducted by Todd were not 
necessarily unreliable, because the level of VOCs detected 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
different for every compound. For benzene, it is about 3 ug/m3 for every 
1 ppb; for other compounds, it ranges from about 3 ug/m3 for every 1 ppb 
to 7 ug/m3 for every 1 ppb. For the sake of analyzing Todd's 
testimony, we have made rough conversions, using 4 ug/m3 for 
every 1 ppb. No difference in outcome would result from using 
another conversion equation. 
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and (arguably) attributable to the Shaw carpet were so low 
and so close to background levels, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding Todd's testimony that the 
Shaw carpet was emitting VOCs sufficient to cause Heller's 
illness--a conclusion that was unreliable if based on the 
closet tests alone. Todd, however, attempted to reinforce his 
closet tests--and to provide a stronger foundation for his 
opinion about the dangerous level of VOCs in the house--by 
introducing his back-extrapolation methodology in a 
supplemental expert witness report (issued in March 1997, 
following his original January 1997 report). We turn to this 
aspect of his testimony. 
 
2.  Back-Extrapolation Methodology 
 
If Todd's sampling of the air in the closet: (1) was reliable 
and adequately controlled for factors other than the Shaw 
carpet, and (2) demonstrated that the Shaw carpet was 
emitting VOCs at potentially harmful levels, his testimony 
would be sufficiently reliable to meet the Daubert standard 
and hence would be admissible. While we believe that the 
first proposition may be true, as noted above, the closet tests 
themselves fail to demonstrate the second. If it was possible 
to use the results of the closet tests to estimate, in a 
scientifically valid way, the level of VOCs emitted by the 
carpet at some earlier time, and if these estimated levels were 
potentially harmful, again, Todd's testimony would be reliable 
and relevant. We express no opinion as to whether 
extrapolation back in time, using known levels of compounds 
and a scientifically valid mathematical formula for the 
extrapolation, would meet the standards of Rule 702 and 
Daubert. Cf. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 
F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (approving of a back-extrapolation 
and half-life methodology that "has been subjected to, and 
survived, the rigors of testing, publication, and peer review, 
and . . . appears to have won significant (if not universal) 
acceptance within the scientific community"). Here, however, 
it is clear that Todd's formula for his extrapolation was based 
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on speculation and estimation that was subject to gross 
error, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding Todd's testimony based on the back- 
extrapolation.15 Indeed, we doubt that Todd's back- 
extrapolation methodology would meet even one of the eight 
suggested factors from Daubert and Paoli. 
 
Heller argues that the back-extrapolation method is "a 
standard reversibility of chemical processes equation," 
Appellants' Br. at 27, but provides no support for the 
reliability of Todd's equation or for the suggested relationship 
between chemical half-lives and the level of VOCs in the air. 
Todd's back-extrapolation method relies on at least three 
questionable assumptions: (1) the concentration of VOCs in 
the air declines exponentially by half-lives (i.e., the level of 
VOCs are cut in half every X days or weeks or years); (2) the 
half-life of VOCs in the air can be estimated based on 
information on the decay curve of VOC emissions from 
carpets; and (3) the concentration of VOCs in the air is not 
affected by anything other than its natural half-life decline.  
 
None of these assumptions, however, appears supported by 
reliable scientific methods or the reliable application of any 
valid theory. In fact, Todd admitted as much in his own 
testimony and expert report. See, e.g., App. at A350-351, 
A761-762; id. at SA0247 (Todd's Expert Report: "The precise 
magnitude of difference quantitatively in off-gassing 
emissions at the carpet between April 1994 and December 
1993 is not readily evident from the published literature and 
or studies conducted by the rug manufacturers or their trade 
associations."). In fact, numerous published studies and 
industry documents consistently demonstrate that the actual 
rate of decline of emissions from carpet is nothing like a half- 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
15.  Plaintiff relies heavily on a Louisiana state case to 
support Todd's back-extrapolation theory. See Appellants' Br. at 
38-40. The judgment in that case, however, has been reversed and 
a new trial ordered, specifically because the trial court failed 
to hold a Daubert hearing and to find whether the Daubert 
criteria were met, as required by Louisiana law. See Caubarreaux 
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours, 714 So. 2d 67, 71-72 (La. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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life progression. See, e.g., id. at A128, A145, A242, A248-250, 
A268-270, SA0860, SA0956, SA1020. Rather, emissions 
decline rapidly in the first hours and days after installation, 
reaching a level of about 10% of the original emission rate in 
only one week and as low as .05% of the initial emission rate 
in only one month. The differences between the emission 
rates indicated in these studies and those estimated by 
Todd's back-extrapolation theory are fairly substantial. (We 
express them  graphically in the margin.16)  For example, 
under Todd's theory, about ten days after installation of new 
carpet, VOCs would remain at levels approximately 50% of 
their initial level, while the studies in the record indicate that 
the levels would actually be less than 10% of their initial 
level. Within three weeks of installation, under Todd's theory, 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
16   
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VOCs would be at 25% of their initial level, while the studies 
show that carpet, at this point, is emitting only about 1% of 
the initial amount of VOCs emitted at the time of installation. 
In short, the VOC levels estimated by Todd greatly exceed 
those which more likely existed, and follow a very different 
curve. Therefore, the District Court properly exercised its 
discretion to exclude this part of Todd's testimony.   
 
Heller contends that even if Todd's "calculations were 
imprecise, it is undisputed that the level of VOC emissions in 
December 1993 were significantly higher than the VOC levels 
measured in April 1994." Appellants' Br. at 10 n.2. The 
problem with this argument, however, is that even if the 
levels were higher in December 1993, the calculations of 
plaintiff's expert were "imprecise" because his methodology 
was unreliable, and therefore Heller has presented no reliable 
evidence to demonstrate what the actual (or even reliably 
estimated) level of VOCs was in December 1993. Without a 
reliable method to determine how much higher the levels 
were in December 1993, only the actually measured levels in 
April 1994 are admissible evidence--and, as noted above, 
these levels were far too low to prove that the Shaw carpet 
was emitting harmful levels of VOCs.   
 
There are other flaws in Todd's back-extrapolation 
testimony that also support the District Court's decision to 
exclude this testimony. First, Todd conflates emission rates 
and air concentration rates in his analysis. All of the record 
data on which Todd claims he relied to estimate his back- 
extrapolation formula involve the declining emission rate: 
VOCs are emitted at a certain rate at the time of carpet 
installation; by 24 hours later, they are emitted at 
approximately half this rate; by a week later, they are emitted 
at approximately 10% the original rate, etc. The air 
concentration of VOCs (which is what Todd measured in the 
closet in April and May 1994, and used as the starting point 
for his back-extrapolation) is a function of not only the rate  
at which VOCs are emitted from the carpet to the air, but 
also such factors as the rate at which VOCs dissipate in the 
air, the size of the room or house in which the VOCs are 
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emitted, the molecular weight of the particular VOC, the rate 
of air flow, the moisture, light, and air temperature in the 
room, and other factors. See, e.g., John C. Little et al.,  
Modeling Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds from New 
Carpets, 28 Atmospheric Env't 227 (1994) (describing 
development of a model indicating that air concentration of  
a VOC is a function of time, distance from carpet, diffusion 
rate of the VOC, carpet thickness, air flow rate, carpet and 
room area, and air volume). Therefore, to measure the air 
concentration at one point in time (as Todd did) and to 
attempt to estimate the air concentration four months earlier, 
one would need to know (or have a good estimate of) each of 
these factors, i.e., emission rates, room size, air flow, 
dissipation rate of each compound, etc.--none of which Todd 
considered in his back-extrapolation formula. 
 
Second, there is at least one study in the record that 
appears to indicate that while emission rates of VOCs decline 
rapidly (see supra note 16), air concentration levels remain 
fairly constant after an initial slight increase, making Todd's 
conflation of these two factors even more problematic. See 
Alfred T. Hodgson et al., Emissions of Volatile Organic 
Compounds from New Carpets Measured in a Large-Scale 
Environmental Chamber, J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, Mar. 
1993, at 316, 323 (describing study indicating that emission 
rates of styrene and 4-phenylcyclohexene decline rapidly, 
while air concentration rates fluctuate within a relatively 
narrow range). Therefore, it is entirely plausible that the level 
of VOCs in the air was not much higher in December 1993 
than the very low level measured in April 1994, the only time 
such VOCs were actually measured. 
 
Finally, if one were to credit Todd's back-extrapolation 
theory, it would actually invalidate his closet studies, thereby 
eliminating the only basis for his opinion that the Shaw 
carpet was the  source of the  VOCs in the  Heller home. This 
is because the decline in benzene and 2-butoxyethanol, two 
of the key VOCs on which plaintiff rests her case, could be 
explained almost entirely by the back-extrapolation theory, 
eliminating the possibility that it was the removal of the 
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carpet that caused the levels of these VOCs to decline. Under 
Todd's back-extrapolation theory, the benzene would be 
expected to decline from 2.22 ppb on April 14, 1994, to 
approximately 0.40 ppb on May 11, 1994, even without the 
removal of the Shaw carpet; it actually declined to only 0.55 
ppb. The 2-butoxyethanol would have been expected to 
decline from 5.6 ppb to approximately 1.0 ppb; it actually 
declined to 0.0 ppb, making the maximum amount 
attributable to the removed carpet only 1.0 ppb-- 
substantially lower than the recommended limit of 20,000 
ppb for this compound. The District Court noted this 
inconsistency, see Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *12, as did 
Todd himself implicitly on cross-examination at the Daubert 
hearing, see App. at A543, A886. 
 
3.  Todd's Testimony: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Although we believe that the District Court may have been 
overly critical of Todd's closet tests and that those aspects of 
its unreliability finding may have been inconsistent with the 
exercise of sound discretion, given the patent unreliability of 
Todd's back-extrapolation theory and the fact that the closet 
tests did not indicate levels of VOCs anywhere near the levels 
found to cause illnesses in humans, we hold that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all of Todd's 
testimony. Cf. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 749 n.19 (noting that all of an 
expert's testimony could be excluded as irrelevant if it no 
longer assists plaintiff's case after certain parts are excluded 
as unreliable). 
 
IV.  Summary Judgment 
 
Without Dr. Papano's testimony on specific causation or 
Todd's testimony on the allegedly higher levels of VOCs in 
December 1993 (both of which we hold the District Court was 
correct to exclude), the remaining expert testimony and other 
evidence in the record are insufficient to create a material 
issue on causation. We note that the District Court granted 
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summary judgment at least in part because "defendant's 
carpeting is not the obvious cause of plaintiffs' illnesses." 
Heller, 1997 WL 535163, at *18. This appears to place a more 
stringent burden on plaintiff than is warranted at summary 
judgment, but the District Court also relied on the total lack 
of causation evidence absent the expert testimony, which is 
a proper ground for summary judgment.   
 
Certain of plaintiff's claims do not rely on the causal 
connection between Heller's illness and the Shaw carpet to 
survive. However, without Todd's testimony, plaintiff has 
failed to offer admissible proof that the Shaw carpet was 
defective. The only claim that does not require proof of either 
the causal connection or defectiveness is plaintiff's 
misrepresentation claim. We are satisfied, however, that the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment on this 
claim as well. See id. at *19 ("[T]here is no evidence of record 
to support plaintiffs' assertion that they were injured by 
reliance on [Shaw's] alleged misrepresentation."). 
 
The order of the District Court granting summary judgment 
to Shaw will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
     Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
     for the Third Circuit 
 35 
 
